Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
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It is considered a house allocation problem with random priority. The main purpose of the paper is to understand the relation between ex post efficiency and ordinal efficiency. To do this a domination notion is introduced. This kind of domination compares sets of assignments. the main result states: let \({\mathcal L}\) be an arbitrary decomposition of a random assignment \(P\). The latter is ordinally efficient if and only if each subset \(M\) of the full support of lottery \({\mathcal L}\) is undominated. The proposed domination is an extension of Pareto domination, namely any set which consists of Pareto inefficient assignments is dominated. Moreover, the sets of only Pareto efficient assignments might be dominated in the proposed sense.
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Cited in
(42)- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
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- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
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- Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line
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