Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteries
- Dynamic inventory policy with varying stochastic demands
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Microeconomic theory
- On Representatives of Subsets
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
Cited in
(41)- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- On slots' scheduling
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
- Popular mixed matchings
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
- Shortest paths with ordinal weights
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- Efficient lottery design
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Ordinal allocation
- Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Assigning agents to a line
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Empirical welfare economics
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
- Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line
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