Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
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Publication:2482677
DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0088-ZzbMATH Open1149.91048OpenAlexW2019056646MaRDI QIDQ2482677FDOQ2482677
Authors: Mihai Manea 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0088-z
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Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
Cited In (10)
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
- Efficient lottery design
- The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
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