Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0088-zzbMath1149.91048OpenAlexW2019056646MaRDI QIDQ2482677

Mihai Manea

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0088-z

zbMATH Keywords

random serial dictatorshipordinal efficiencyrandom assignment problemordering exchange contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Related Items (6)

Efficient lottery design ⋮ The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem ⋮ Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals

Cites Work

• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• On cores and indivisibility
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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