Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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Publication:1242792
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0zbMath0368.90025OpenAlexW2005263243MaRDI QIDQ1242792
Andrew Postlewaite, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0
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