Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- House allocation with existing tenants
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- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
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- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- Matching with ownership
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Matching with restricted trade
- Matching with partners and projects
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Core concepts for incomplete market economies
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Reducing rank-maximal to maximum weight matching
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- The exchange-stable marriage problem
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- A reformulation of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability: \(m\)-stability
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
- Replica economies with congested public goods
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- House-swapping with divorcing and engaged pairs
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods
- COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY
- Bounded Unpopularity Matchings
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Market Design
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- House exchange and residential segregation in networks
- Random popular matchings with incomplete preference lists
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House allocation with transfers
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- The core for housing markets with limited externalities
- Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
- Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Farsighted house allocation
- Popular matchings with variable item copies
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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