Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
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Publication:2138371
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102627zbMath1490.91116OpenAlexW4200011307MaRDI QIDQ2138371
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102627
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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