Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102627MaRDI QIDQ2138371zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miho Hong, Jaeok Park

Publication date 11 May 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102627

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoreexternalitiesindivisibilitytop trading cycleshousing markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
• A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences

Cites work

• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
• On cores and indivisibility
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
• School choice with neighbors
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• The roommate problem with externalities
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• Two-sided matching with externalities: a survey
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(11)

• A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences
• Top trading cycles
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
• A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
• Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• The core for housing markets with limited externalities
• On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf

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