Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102627zbMATH Open1490.91116OpenAlexW4200011307MaRDI QIDQ2138371FDOQ2138371
Authors: Miho Hong, Jaeok Park 
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102627
Recommendations
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
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- A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- Top trading cycles
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
- The core for housing markets with limited externalities
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences
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