A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.01.001zbMATH Open1297.91096OpenAlexW2020354965MaRDI QIDQ2452230FDOQ2452230

Authors: Keisuke Bando 

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.001

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilityexternalitiesfixed point algorithmdeferred acceptance algorithmmany-to-one matching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods

Cited In (11)

• The roommate problem with externalities
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
• Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities

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