A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.001zbMath1297.91096OpenAlexW2020354965MaRDI QIDQ2452230

Keisuke Bando

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityexternalitiesdeferred acceptance algorithmfixed point algorithmmany-to-one matching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

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