Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.008zbMath1236.91096OpenAlexW3122863029MaRDI QIDQ2427870

Keisuke Bando

Publication date: 18 April 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityexternalitiesmany-to-one matching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Matching with aggregate externalities ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability ⋮ Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets ⋮ Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

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