Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.05.002MaRDI QIDQ2638313zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ayşe Mumcu, Ismail Saglam

Publication date 15 September 2010

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

coreexternalitiesone-to-one matchingstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Cited in

(21)

• Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Stable matching with network externalities
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
• Comparative Static and Computational Methods for an Empirical One-to-one Transferable Utility Matching Model
• A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
• Matching with Externalities
• Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
• The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma
• Stability as right to counsel of choice: a lawyers' matching problem
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

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