Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities
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Publication:5013394
DOI10.1142/S0219198920500152zbMath1479.91238OpenAlexW2994887507MaRDI QIDQ5013394
Publication date: 30 November 2021
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920500152
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Cites Work
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