Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2291zbMath0892.90049OpenAlexW2000982483MaRDI QIDQ1368881

Jordi Massó, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143269

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitytwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (37)

Matching with aggregate externalities ⋮ On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗ ⋮ A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues ⋮ Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories ⋮ The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts ⋮ Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities ⋮ Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Many-to-one matchings without substitutability ⋮ The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model ⋮ On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules. ⋮ School choice with neighbors ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search ⋮ Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players ⋮ Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ Two-sided coalitional matchings ⋮ Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples ⋮ Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences ⋮ Coalition formation games with separable preferences. ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities ⋮ Preference aggregation for couples ⋮ Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle

Cites Work

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• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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