Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
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Publication:2854007
DOI10.1142/S0219198913400082zbMATH Open1274.91329OpenAlexW2026670976MaRDI QIDQ2854007FDOQ2854007
Authors: Péter Biró, Flip Klijn 
Publication date: 17 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400082
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computational complexitymatchingstabilityincentive compatibilitycoupleslarge marketsrestricted domains
Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Stable matchings with couples
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Core of an N Person Game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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- Stable marriage and genetic algorithms: a fertile union
Cited In (18)
- Preference aggregation for couples
- Market Design
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets
- On the complexity of stable fractional hypergraph matching
- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
- Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
- Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
- Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems
- A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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