Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
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Publication:2854007
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Size versus stability in the marriage problem
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
- Stable marriage and genetic algorithms: a fertile union
- Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable matchings with couples
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
Cited in
(19)- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
- Market Design
- Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
- Two-sided matching with externalities: a survey
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
- Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
- Preference aggregation for couples
- Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- A note on a two-sided discrete-concave market with possibly bounded salaries
- Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16101 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the complexity of stable fractional hypergraph matching
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
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