MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
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Publication:2854007
DOI10.1142/S0219198913400082zbMath1274.91329MaRDI QIDQ2854007
Publication date: 17 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400082
stability; computational complexity; matching; incentive compatibility; couples; restricted domains; large markets
91A80: Applications of game theory
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91B68: Matching models
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