Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00534-1zbMATH Open1032.91095OpenAlexW1982731672MaRDI QIDQ1811552FDOQ1811552

Authors: Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó 

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00534-1

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zbMATH Keywords

Matching(Weak) stabilityBargaining set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation

Cited In (16)

• The core of school choice problems
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Fair student placement
• Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• A bargaining set for roommate problems
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
• Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• Stability in dynamic matching markets

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