Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00534-1zbMath1032.91095OpenAlexW1982731672MaRDI QIDQ1811552

Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00534-1

zbMATH Keywords

Matching(Weak) stabilityBargaining set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ Stability in dynamic matching markets ⋮ Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems ⋮ Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem ⋮ Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Fair student placement ⋮ Stability of marriage with externalities ⋮ Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets ⋮ Stable matchings and preferences of couples ⋮ A bargaining set for roommate problems ⋮ Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY

Cites Work

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• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage