Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00534-1MaRDI QIDQ1811552zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó

Publication date 17 June 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00534-1, https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143631

zbMATH Keywords

(Weak) stabilityBargaining setMatching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(18)

• Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
• Fair student placement
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• A bargaining set for roommate problems
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
• Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• The core of school choice problems
• A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets
• The properness of weak stability notions
• Stability of marriage with externalities

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