An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set

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Publication:1123107


DOI10.1016/0304-4068(89)90017-7zbMath0676.90011WikidataQ56936208 ScholiaQ56936208MaRDI QIDQ1123107

Andreu Mas-Colell

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/23071


91A12: Cooperative games

91B50: General equilibrium theory


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