scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015

zbMath0351.90012MaRDI QIDQ4121644

Werner Hildenbrand

Publication date: 1974

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) General equilibrium theory (91B50) General reference works (handbooks, dictionaries, bibliographies, etc.) pertaining to measure and integration (28-00)

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