The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00010-5zbMath0960.91046OpenAlexW1978298967MaRDI QIDQ1975170

Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé

Publication date: 11 May 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00010-5

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolyevolutionimitationWalrasian equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations ⋮ Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment ⋮ Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games ⋮ Oligopoly game: price makers meet price takers ⋮ Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets ⋮ Economic Darwinism ⋮ Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities ⋮ RANDOM DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS IN ECONOMICS ⋮ Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability ⋮ Stochastic stability on general state spaces

Cites Work

• Markov chains and stochastic stability
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Convex Analysis
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item