The Evolution of Conventions
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Publication:5289300
DOI10.2307/2951778zbMath0773.90101MaRDI QIDQ5289300
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b18f5552423e81e743988ea414f1aa6abbf6251
equilibrium selection; fictitious play; stochastically stable equilibria; perturbed Markov processes
92D15: Problems related to evolution
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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