The Evolution of Conventions
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Publication:5289300
DOI10.2307/2951778zbMATH Open0773.90101OpenAlexW2118994458MaRDI QIDQ5289300FDOQ5289300
Authors: H. Peyton Young 
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b18f5552423e81e743988ea414f1aa6abbf6251
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Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Learning in Games
- Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
- Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- Coordination and culture
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- The value of a coordination game
- Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
- Evolutionary dynamics of the Nash demand game: a diffusion approach
- Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games
- Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players
- Behavior in strategic settings: evidence from a million rock-paper-scissors games
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
- On the geography of conventions
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- On convergence rates of game theoretic reinforcement learning algorithms
- Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
- Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
- Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Evolution and information in a gift-giving game
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Hypergraph Coloring Games and Voter Models
- Information, interaction and memory
- Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes
- Evolutionary choice of markets
- Evolutionary game theory
- The cutting power of preparation
- More neighbors, more efficiency
- On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations
- History as a coordination device
- Some bounds for Markov chains
- Coevolution of cooperation and network structure in social dilemmas in evolutionary dynamic complex network
- A characterization of stochastically stable networks
- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
- Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation
- Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
- Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
- From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
- \(p\)-best response set
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations
- Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
- Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand paradox.
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
- Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Stability and segregation in group formation
- Potential games in volatile environments
- Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
- Stochastic stability in networks with decay
- Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
- Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space
- Sampled fictitious play for approximate dynamic programming
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
- Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
- Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
- An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment
- Dissonance minimization as a microfoundation of social influence in models of opinion formation
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Evolving aspirations and cooperation
- Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
- Pure Nash equilibria and best-response dynamics in random games
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- Multi-scale metastable dynamics and the asymptotic stationary distribution of perturbed Markov chains
- Dynamics in atomic signaling games
- Vector space structure of finite evolutionary games and its application to strategy profile convergence
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