The Evolution of Conventions
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Publication:5289300
DOI10.2307/2951778zbMATH Open0773.90101OpenAlexW2118994458MaRDI QIDQ5289300FDOQ5289300
Authors: H. Peyton Young 
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b18f5552423e81e743988ea414f1aa6abbf6251
Recommendations
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Learning in Games
- Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
- Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- Coordination and culture
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- The value of a coordination game
- Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
- Evolutionary dynamics of the Nash demand game: a diffusion approach
- Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games
- Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players
- Behavior in strategic settings: evidence from a million rock-paper-scissors games
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
- On the geography of conventions
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- On convergence rates of game theoretic reinforcement learning algorithms
- Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
- Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
- Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Evolution and information in a gift-giving game
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Hypergraph Coloring Games and Voter Models
- Information, interaction and memory
- Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes
- Evolutionary choice of markets
- Evolutionary game theory
- The cutting power of preparation
- More neighbors, more efficiency
- On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations
- History as a coordination device
- Some bounds for Markov chains
- Coevolution of cooperation and network structure in social dilemmas in evolutionary dynamic complex network
- A characterization of stochastically stable networks
- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
- Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation
- Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
- Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
- From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
- \(p\)-best response set
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations
- Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
- Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand paradox.
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
- Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
- Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
- The evolution of cooperation through imitation
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- A bargaining approach to coordination in networks
- Building up social capital in a changing world
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Effective free energy for individual dynamics
- The asset market game
- BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM NOTIONS FOR SOCIAL NETWORK FORMATION PROCESSES
- On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Social learning in recurring games
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Will reasoning improve learning?
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.
- Robust stochastic stability
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
- Language structure: psychological and social constraints
- Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents
- Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. II: \(2 \times 2\) games
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
- Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation
- Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
- Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction.
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
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