The Evolution of Conventions
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Publication:5289300
DOI10.2307/2951778zbMATH Open0773.90101OpenAlexW2118994458MaRDI QIDQ5289300FDOQ5289300
Authors: H. Peyton Young 
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b18f5552423e81e743988ea414f1aa6abbf6251
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Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
- Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Stability and segregation in group formation
- Potential games in volatile environments
- Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
- Stochastic stability in networks with decay
- Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
- Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space
- Sampled fictitious play for approximate dynamic programming
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
- Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
- Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
- An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment
- Dissonance minimization as a microfoundation of social influence in models of opinion formation
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Evolving aspirations and cooperation
- Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
- Pure Nash equilibria and best-response dynamics in random games
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- Multi-scale metastable dynamics and the asymptotic stationary distribution of perturbed Markov chains
- Dynamics in atomic signaling games
- Vector space structure of finite evolutionary games and its application to strategy profile convergence
- How noise matters.
- Stochastic stability in a double auction
- Revisiting log-linear learning: asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
- Stability and stabilization of a class of finite evolutionary games
- State based potential games
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- Conflict and segregation in networks: an experiment on the interplay between individual preferences and social influence
- Network formation games with teams
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
- Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
- Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Structural holes in social networks
- Experiments with network formation
- Group selection: the quest for social preferences
- Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
- Multi-level evolution in population games
- Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games
- Multi-player games on the cycle
- Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games
- Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions
- The evolution of exchange.
- On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
- A semi-tensor product approach to networked evolutionary games
- The dynamics of costly signaling
- An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
- Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Coordination and turnout in large elections
- The logit-response dynamics
- Evolution of social networks
- Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
- Diffusion dynamics in small-world networks with heterogeneous consumers
- Dynamics in near-potential games
- Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
- Contagion and efficiency
- Learning by trial and error
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
- Evolution with changing mutation rates
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
- Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning
- Phenotype switching and mutations in random environments
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