The Evolution of Conventions
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Publication:5289300
DOI10.2307/2951778zbMATH Open0773.90101OpenAlexW2118994458MaRDI QIDQ5289300FDOQ5289300
Authors: H. Peyton Young 
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b18f5552423e81e743988ea414f1aa6abbf6251
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Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Learning in Games
- Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
- Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- Coordination and culture
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- The value of a coordination game
- Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
- Evolutionary dynamics of the Nash demand game: a diffusion approach
- Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games
- Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players
- Behavior in strategic settings: evidence from a million rock-paper-scissors games
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
- On the geography of conventions
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- On convergence rates of game theoretic reinforcement learning algorithms
- Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
- Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
- Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Evolution and information in a gift-giving game
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Hypergraph Coloring Games and Voter Models
- Information, interaction and memory
- Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes
- Evolutionary choice of markets
- Evolutionary game theory
- The cutting power of preparation
- More neighbors, more efficiency
- On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations
- History as a coordination device
- Some bounds for Markov chains
- Coevolution of cooperation and network structure in social dilemmas in evolutionary dynamic complex network
- A characterization of stochastically stable networks
- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
- Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation
- Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
- Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
- From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
- \(p\)-best response set
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations
- Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
- Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand paradox.
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
- Contagion and efficiency
- Learning by trial and error
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
- Evolution with changing mutation rates
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
- Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning
- Phenotype switching and mutations in random environments
- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
- Evolution of theories of mind
- Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games
- On acyclicity of games with cycles
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- On the co-existence of conventions
- Private provision of discrete public goods
- Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
- Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
- Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
- Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
- Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks
- Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
- Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
- Network structure and strategic investments: an experimental analysis
- Stochastic stability in best shot network games
- Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game
- Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
- Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence
- Network formation and social coordination
- Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment
- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
- Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality
- Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
- BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
- Nash blocks
- Social norms and random matching games
- Clever agents in adaptive learning.
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