The Evolution of Conventions
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Publication:5289300
DOI10.2307/2951778zbMATH Open0773.90101OpenAlexW2118994458MaRDI QIDQ5289300FDOQ5289300
Authors: H. Peyton Young 
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b18f5552423e81e743988ea414f1aa6abbf6251
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Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
- Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
- Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
- The evolution of cooperation through imitation
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- A bargaining approach to coordination in networks
- Building up social capital in a changing world
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Effective free energy for individual dynamics
- The asset market game
- BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM NOTIONS FOR SOCIAL NETWORK FORMATION PROCESSES
- On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Social learning in recurring games
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Will reasoning improve learning?
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.
- Robust stochastic stability
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
- Language structure: psychological and social constraints
- Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents
- Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. II: \(2 \times 2\) games
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
- Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation
- Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
- Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction.
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- Learning, matching, and aggregation
- Imitation with asymmetric memory
- The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.
- Unfolding social hierarchies
- Cooperation through imitation
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Adaptive play with spatial sampling.
- Gender-based focal points
- Network formation and stable equilibrium
- Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- Bubbles and crashes: gradient dynamics in financial markets
- Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- An experimental study of costly coordination
- A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
- Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
- Contagion and efficiency
- Learning by trial and error
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
- Evolution with changing mutation rates
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
- Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning
- Phenotype switching and mutations in random environments
- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
- Evolution of theories of mind
- Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games
- On acyclicity of games with cycles
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- On the co-existence of conventions
- Private provision of discrete public goods
- Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
- Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
- Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
- Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
- Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks
- Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
- Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
- Network structure and strategic investments: an experimental analysis
- Stochastic stability in best shot network games
- Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game
- Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
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