An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
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Publication:2278938
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.014zbMath1429.91048OpenAlexW2977940758MaRDI QIDQ2278938
William H. Sandholm, Luis R. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo
Publication date: 12 December 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.014
Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cites Work
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