Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
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Publication:1815195
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0076zbMATH Open0859.90138OpenAlexW2078764681MaRDI QIDQ1815195FDOQ1815195
Authors: Arthur Robson, Fernando Vega-Redondo 
Publication date: 7 November 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/vega-robson.pdf
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)
Cited In (82)
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- Learning correlated equilibria in population games.
- The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
- ON THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT MATCHING SCHEMES
- Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
- Network characteristics enabling efficient coordination: a simulation study
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution
- Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation
- Stochastic replicator dynamics: a theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment
- International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
- Experimental evidence of behavioral improvement by learning and intermediate advice
- BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
- The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition
- When are efficient conventions selected in networks?
- Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand firms: exploring imitation and replicator processes
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics
- The evolution of focal points
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
- The value of a coordination game
- Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games
- Matching, imitation, and coordination in networks
- Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium
- Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays
- Evolutionary games and matching rules
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
- Continuous-time strategy selection in linear population games
- The dynamics of norms and conventions under local interactions and imitation
- Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
- Stochastic stability in networks with decay
- Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
- Robust stochastic stability
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Network formation and social coordination
- Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
- Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
- Coordination games on dynamical networks
- Information, interaction and memory
- Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
- Evolutionary game theory
- Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation
- Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
- Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players
- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game
- Imitation with asymmetric memory
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
- Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation
- Unfolding social hierarchies
- Cooperation through imitation
- Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets
- Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies
- Local interaction on random graphs
- Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
- Competing conventions
- Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
- Stochastic imitation in finite games
- Learning in games by random sampling
- On the observational equivalence of random matching
- Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
- Random matching in adaptive dynamics
- Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
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