International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
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Publication:6074907
Recommendations
- International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
- Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
Cites work
- A climate agreement with full participation
- A limit theorem for a class of inhomogeneous Markov processes
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Contagion and efficiency
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
- Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
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