International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries

DOI10.1111/IJET.12296zbMath1530.91458OpenAlexW3123582642MaRDI QIDQ6074907

Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow, Shi-Miin Liu

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12296

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamemutationstochastically stablelong-run equilibriuminternational environmental agreementimitations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms

Cites Work

• Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
• Contagion and efficiency
• A limit theorem for a class of inhomogeneous Markov processes
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• A climate agreement with full participation
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• TAX COMPETITION, RELATIVE PERFORMANCE, AND POLICY IMITATION
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements

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