The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
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Publication:1959114
DOI10.1007/s10614-010-9232-0zbMath1233.91207WikidataQ57126309 ScholiaQ57126309MaRDI QIDQ1959114
Richard S. J. Tol, Dritan Osmani
Publication date: 6 October 2010
Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/3d286f7c-fcb4-4716-bbb0-f4767b3e1ed8
stability; nonlinear optimization; non-cooperative game theory; self-enforcing international environmental agreements
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries, Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements, Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries, Issue linkage
Cites Work
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
