Regional versus global cooperation for climate control

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2005.04.004MaRDI QIDQ2493793zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Geir B. Asheim, Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi, Fredric C. Menz

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

climate changeinternational environmental agreementsKyoto Protocolnon-cooperative game theorypublic goodsregional cooperationweak renegotiation proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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• Targets for global climate policy: an overview
• How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
• Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas
• Global refunding and climate change
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
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• International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
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• Power to youth: designing democracy for long-term well-being

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