Regional versus global cooperation for climate control

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004zbMath1131.91369OpenAlexW2134550488MaRDI QIDQ2493793

Geir B. Asheim, Fredric C. Menz, Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsnon-cooperative game theoryclimate changeinternational environmental agreementsKyoto Protocolregional cooperationweak renegotiation proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18)

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