Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2493793
DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004zbMath1131.91369MaRDI QIDQ2493793
Geir B. Asheim, Fredric C. Menz, Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004
public goods; non-cooperative game theory; climate change; international environmental agreements; Kyoto Protocol; regional cooperation; weak renegotiation proofness
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91B18: Public goods
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