Recommendations
- Sharing the cost of global warming
- Compensation for ``meaningful participation in climate change control: A modest proposal and empirical analysis
- Designing and forecasting the differentiated carbon tax scheme based on the principle of ability to pay
- An optional permit system for global pollution control
- Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction
Cites work
- A climate agreement with full participation
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- The economics of controlling stock pollutants: An efficient strategy for greenhouse gases
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
Cited in
(4)- A refunding scheme to incentivize narrow-spectrum antibiotic development
- Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5007560 (Why is no real title available?)
- Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
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