Global refunding and climate change

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.001zbMath1345.91057OpenAlexW3122804467MaRDI QIDQ311034

Hans Gersbach, Ralph Winkler

Publication date: 28 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

climate change mitigationglobal refunding schemeincentive-compatible mechanismsinternational agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items

A refunding scheme to incentivize narrow-spectrum antibiotic development, Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding, Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements

Cites Work

• Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• The economics of controlling stock pollutants: An efficient strategy for greenhouse gases
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• A climate agreement with full participation
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control