Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
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Publication:951437
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 706270 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1507330 (Why is no real title available?)
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
Cited in
(36)- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Intertemporal transfer institutions
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games
- Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control
- Trade as transfers, GATT and the core
- Node-consistent Shapley value for games played over event trees with random terminal time
- Convergence of strong time-consistent payment schemes in dynamic games
- Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games
- Node-consistent core for games played over event trees
- Management of a transboundary wildlife population: A self-enforcing cooperative agreement with renegotiation and variable transfer payments
- Balanced environmental games
- A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects
- A friendly computable characteristic function
- Global refunding and climate change
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- Strategic support of node-consistent cooperative outcomes in dynamic games played over event trees
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
- The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia
- Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees
- Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs
- Collaborative environmental management: a review of the literature
- Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
- Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game
- Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis
- Who pays the bill? Climate change, taxes, and transfers in a multi-region growth model
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
- Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees
- Altruistic behavior and international environmental agreements: a differential game approach
- A dynamic game of waste management
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset
- Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model
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