PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
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Recommendations
- Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
- Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
Cites work
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
Cited in
(8)- Estimating strategic models of international treaty formation
- Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
- Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment
- How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
- Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
- The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements
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