PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2006.TB00179.XMaRDI QIDQ3616626zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen

Publication date 26 March 2009

Published in Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74136

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries

Cites work

• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control

Cited in

(8)

• Estimating strategic models of international treaty formation
• Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?
• Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
• Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
• Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment
• How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
• Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
• The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements

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