Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111164MaRDI QIDQ6047355zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nobuyuki Takashima

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111164

zbMATH Keywords

initial payment and refundinginternational environmental agreementsself-enforcingthird-party organizationstransboundary pollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries

Cites work

• Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment?
• Global refunding and climate change

Cited in

(3)

• Cross-country technology transfer and politically driven international agreements for environmental standards
• The climate policy hold-up: green technologies, intellectual property rights, and the abatement incentives of international agreements
• Barrett's paradox of cooperation in the case of quasi-linear utilities

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