International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control

DOI10.1007/S10479-012-1156-8zbMATH Open1301.91035OpenAlexW1967823079MaRDI QIDQ475308FDOQ475308

Authors Mélanie Heugues 

Publication date 26 November 2014

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1156-8

zbMATH Keywords

climate changestrategic complementaritiesinternational environmental agreementsnoncooperative game theoryglobal environmental problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• Stability of international environmental agreements in leadership model

Cites Work

• Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced technological change
• Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol

Cited In (10)

• Stability of international environmental agreements in leadership model
• The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
• International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
• Technology adoption with carbon emission trading mechanism: modeling with heterogeneous agents and uncertain carbon price
• Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
• An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases
• Do voluntary international environmental agreements work?
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE

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