International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
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Publication:2354544
DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0837-8zbMath1319.91127OpenAlexW2131416365MaRDI QIDQ2354544
Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eftichios S. Sartzetakis
Publication date: 20 July 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0837-8
Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (9)
The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game ⋮ Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries ⋮ Overlapping climate clubs: self-enforcing R\&D networks to mitigate global warming ⋮ Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements ⋮ The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries ⋮ Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements ⋮ Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
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