Overlapping climate clubs: self-enforcing R\&D networks to mitigate global warming

DOI10.3390/G13010004MaRDI QIDQ2669155zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Emilson C. D. Silva, Chikara Yamaguchi

Publication date 9 March 2022

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010004

zbMATH Keywords

carbon capture and storageclimate clubscoalition-proof equilibriumglobal warminghub-and-spokeinternational environmental agreementsoverlapping coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites work

• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Connections. An introduction to the economics of networks.
• Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
• The formation of networks with transfers among players
• The gamma-core and coalition formation

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