Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0814-2MaRDI QIDQ2256984zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert

Publication date 23 February 2015

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2

zbMATH Keywords

collusionlearningnew marketspreemptionproject selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games of timing (91A55) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications
• Investment timing and learning externalities
• Irreversible investment in alternative projects
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
• Learning dynamics with private and public signals
• Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• Preemption Games with Private Information
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Real options and preemption under incomplete information
• Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems
• Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• The effects of information on strategic investment and welfare

Cited in

(7)

• Preemption with a second-mover advantage
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Hiding and herding in market entry
• Sunk costs, entry and clustering
• Coordination through committees and markets with option timing games
• General timing games with multiple players
• Optimal entry timing

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