Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
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Publication:2256984
DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2zbMath1319.91078OpenAlexW1994675269MaRDI QIDQ2256984
Steffen Lippert, Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi
Publication date: 23 February 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2
Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Games of timing (91A55)
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