Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology

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Publication:3682196

DOI10.2307/2297660zbMath0566.90014OpenAlexW2049095227MaRDI QIDQ3682196

Jean Tirole, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 1985

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297660




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