Continuous-time games of timing
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Publication:1774814
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.02.001zbMath1117.91010OpenAlexW2010881273MaRDI QIDQ1774814
Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille, Rida Laraki
Publication date: 4 May 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1363.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Games of timing (91A55)
Related Items (19)
The challenge of non-zero-sum stochastic games ⋮ Developing real option game models ⋮ Continuous Time Contests with Private Information ⋮ A silent battle over a cake ⋮ Preemptive investment under uncertainty ⋮ A class of solvable stopping games ⋮ Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games ⋮ On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games ⋮ Pure strategy solutions of the progressive discrete silent duel with generalized identical quadratic accuracy functions ⋮ Potential competition in preemption games ⋮ Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ On preemption in discrete and continuous time ⋮ Equilibrium in two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time ⋮ The ordered timeline game: strategic posting times over a temporally ordered shared medium ⋮ Competitive real options under private information ⋮ Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements? ⋮ Inefficiency of sponsored research ⋮ Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
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