Multistage Games with Communication
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Publication:3735519
DOI10.2307/1913154zbMATH Open0599.90134OpenAlexW2059191774MaRDI QIDQ3735519FDOQ3735519
Authors: Roger B. Myerson 
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/590.pdf
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multistage gamescommunication equilibriumcommunication mechanismscentral mediatorCodominated actions
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information
- Subjective evaluation versus public information
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- General properties of long-run supergames
- Expected utility with lower probabilities
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Mediated contracts and mechanism design
- Long persuasion games
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
- Optimal sequential delegation
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Updating confidence in beliefs
- Strong mediated equilibrium
- Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Moral hazard and private monitoring
- Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Small perturbations and stochastic games
- Independence for full conditional probabilities: structure, factorization, non-uniqueness, and Bayesian networks
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Learning in games with cumulative prospect theoretic preferences
- Continuous-time games of timing
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Weighted values and the core
- Money is memory
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Honesty and informal agreements
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol
- Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Construction of a strong Nash equilibrium in a class of infinite nonzero-sum games
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
- Mediation and strategic delay in bargaining and markets
- The limit-price mechanism.
- Discounted quotas
- Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
- Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- Conditional belief types
- Asking questions
- An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
- Correlated equilibrium in stochastic games
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
- Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
- How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
- \textit{simple} mediation in a cheap-talk game
- Mediators in position auctions
- Information flows and memory in games
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- Pivotal persuasion
- Conditional systems revisited
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- Graphoid properties of concepts of independence for sets of probabilities
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- The space of conditional systems is a ball
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
- Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
- The topology-free construction of the universal type structure for conditional probability systems
- Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
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