Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0104-8zbMATH Open1114.91043OpenAlexW2071208786MaRDI QIDQ878397FDOQ878397

Authors: Claudio Mezzetti 

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/4431

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zbMATH Keywords

auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal Auction Design
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types

Cited In (12)

• Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• Efficient incentives with social preferences
• Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus

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