A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007zbMath1393.91091OpenAlexW1550402211MaRDI QIDQ522999

Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsprivacymechanism designincentive compatibilityinterdependent valuesinformational sizeex post incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence

Cites Work

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