Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

DOI10.2307/2297984zbMath0807.90039OpenAlexW1486180420MaRDI QIDQ4301281

John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 21 July 1994

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160328-160830650

zbMATH Keywords

interim efficient mechanismspublic good production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (11)

A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard ⋮ A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems ⋮ Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission ⋮ Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability ⋮ Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont ⋮ Provision of public goods in a large economy

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