Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.003MaRDI QIDQ523008zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng, Xiaohan Zhong

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

serial dictatorshipBostonconstrained school choiceex-ante fairnesspreference submission timing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• Constrained school choice
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

Cited in

(14)

• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
• The instability of matching with overconfident agents
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• A theory of school-choice lotteries
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• Manipulability in school choice
• Self-selection in school choice
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
• Epsilon-stability in school choice
• Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
• The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions

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