Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
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Publication:523008
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.003zbMATH Open1393.91123OpenAlexW3124974000MaRDI QIDQ523008FDOQ523008
Authors: Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng, Xiaohan Zhong 
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.003
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Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Constrained school choice
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
Cited In (14)
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Manipulability in school choice
- Self-selection in school choice
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions
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