Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6541997
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Measuring the instability in two-sided matching procedures
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
- Self-selection in school choice
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
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