Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2416636zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yan Chen, Onur Kesten

Publication date 24 May 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

college admissionsdeferred acceptanceexperimentimmediate acceptance mechanismparallel mechanismschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Auctions, market mechanisms and their applications. First international ICST conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8--9, 2009. Revised Selected Papers
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
• Matching in the large: an experimental study
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• Monotone strategyproofness
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• School choice: an experimental study
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• The modified Boston mechanism

Cited in

(16)

• Matching in the large: an experimental study
• Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
• Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
• The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected?
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
• High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
• The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
• College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: a structural empirical analysis
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
• Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
• Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
• Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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