Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2416636
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.003zbMATH Open1411.91418OpenAlexW2917487352WikidataQ128341894 ScholiaQ128341894MaRDI QIDQ2416636FDOQ2416636
Authors: Yan Chen, Onur Kesten 
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.003
Recommendations
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- School choice: an experimental study
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
experimentdeferred acceptanceschool choicecollege admissionsparallel mechanismimmediate acceptance mechanism
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- School choice: an experimental study
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Auctions, market mechanisms and their applications. First international ICST conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8--9, 2009. Revised Selected Papers
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
Cited In (16)
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
- Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: a structural empirical analysis
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
- School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected?
- Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2416636)
