Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
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Publication:2442836
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Cites work
- A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- College performance predictions and the SAT
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
Cited in
(15)- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Self-selection in school choice
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Simultaneous screening and college admissions
- College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: a structural empirical analysis
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
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