Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
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Publication:1753433
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.12.011zbMATH Open1402.91522OpenAlexW2560667248MaRDI QIDQ1753433FDOQ1753433
Authors: Franz Diebold, Martin Bichler 
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.011
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Cited In (11)
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Optimization-based mechanisms for the course allocation problem
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