Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Finding large stable matchings
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- Linear time local approximation algorithm for maximum stable marriage
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On cores and indivisibility
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Popular Matchings
- Popular Matchings in the Capacitated House Allocation Problem
- Profile-based optimal matchings in the student/project allocation problem
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- School Choice with Consent*
- Stochastic Dominance and Expected Utility: Survey and Analysis
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
Cited in
(13)- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Optimization-based mechanisms for the course allocation problem
- Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
- Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
- Course allocation with credits via stable matching
- Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?
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