Two-sided matching with indifferences
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Publication:2402065
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.07.002zbMath1400.91373OpenAlexW2736806615MaRDI QIDQ2402065
Publication date: 6 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/269832
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