Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach
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Cites work
- An algorithm for the maximum weight strongly stable matching problem
- Characterisation of strongly stable matchings
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
- The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
- The stable admissions polytope
- Total Dual Integrality of Rothblum's Description of the Stable-Marriage Polyhedron
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
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