Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach

DOI10.1007/s40305-021-00360-xOpenAlexW3199277621MaRDI QIDQ2687690

Pablo Neme, Noelia Juarez, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 7 March 2023

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-021-00360-x

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingmatching marketsoptimal stable matchingsthe marriage market with indifferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences

Cites Work

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