Linear programming brings marital bliss
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Publication:1122480
DOI10.1016/0167-6377(89)90041-2zbMath0675.90058OpenAlexW2121619875MaRDI QIDQ1122480
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(89)90041-2
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Cites Work
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- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
- The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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