Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
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Publication:2325654
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01181-xzbMath1425.91337arXiv1707.01231OpenAlexW2963884248WikidataQ128103504 ScholiaQ128103504MaRDI QIDQ2325654
Publication date: 27 September 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.01231
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