The lattice of envy-free matchings

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.016MaRDI QIDQ1753285zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qingyun Wu, Alvin E. Roth

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016

zbMATH Keywords

latticematchingenvy-freevacancy chain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

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• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
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• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
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• On a characterization of stable matchings
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

Cited in

(16)

• Envy-freeness and relaxed stability for lower-quotas: a parameterized perspective
• The envy-free matching problem with pairwise preferences
• College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
• Entering classes in the college admissions model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
• The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
• Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting
• Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division
• The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
• Fair division with two-sided preferences
• Optimal cost-based allocations under two-sided preferences
• Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms

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