The lattice of envy-free matchings
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Publication:1753285
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.016zbMATH Open1390.91246OpenAlexW2782194353MaRDI QIDQ1753285FDOQ1753285
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016
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Cited In (16)
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Optimal cost-based allocations under two-sided preferences
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability for lower-quotas: a parameterized perspective
- Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division
- The envy-free matching problem with pairwise preferences
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting
- Fair division with two-sided preferences
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
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