Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.005zbMATH Open1483.91137OpenAlexW4205747401MaRDI QIDQ2078071FDOQ2078071

Authors Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08156

zbMATH Keywords

lattice structuremany-to-many matching marketsrandom stable matching markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuitive binary operations to compute the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then, we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two dual lattices.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(14)

• Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
• The stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
• A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
• Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
• Lattice structure of many-to-one stable matchings
• A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
• On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
• A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
• The lattice of envy-free matchings

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