Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
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Publication:2078071
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.005zbMath1483.91137arXiv2002.08156OpenAlexW4205747401MaRDI QIDQ2078071
Pablo Neme, Noelia Juarez, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08156
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