Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
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Publication:2078071
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.005zbMATH Open1483.91137arXiv2002.08156OpenAlexW4205747401MaRDI QIDQ2078071FDOQ2078071
Authors: Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo 
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuitive binary operations to compute the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then, we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two dual lattices.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08156
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Cited In (14)
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
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