The ``rural hospital theorem revisited

DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2011.00174.XzbMATH Open1416.91303OpenAlexW1533388238MaRDI QIDQ4583374FDOQ4583374

Authors: Fuhito Kojima 

Publication date: 28 August 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00174.x

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zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilityaffirmative actionrural hospital theoremseparable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (3)

• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings

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