The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.06.004MaRDI QIDQ2675448zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Agustín G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.16330

zbMATH Keywords

latticematchingre-equilibration processTarski operatorworker-quasi-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice that models a re-equilibration process and has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(5)

• The lattice of envy-free matchings
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• The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
• On the existence of stable matchings with contracts

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