On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗

DOI10.1080/02331930108844574MaRDI QIDQ4531544zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 22 May 2002

Published in Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143744

zbMATH Keywords

latticemany-to-one matchingsstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(31)

• An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
• Equivalences between two matching models: stability
• The lattice of envy-free matchings
• The stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared
• On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
• Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
• The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
• A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
• Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
• On the number of employed in the matching model
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Median stable matching for college admissions
• The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
• The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Lattice structure of many-to-one stable matchings
• The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488104 (Why is no real title available?)
• On lattice and DA
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• A note on Roth's consensus property of many-to-one matching
• A binary operation-based representation of a lattice.
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• A generalized assignment game
• A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts

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