Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2586zbMath0955.91048OpenAlexW1975943500MaRDI QIDQ1566906

Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 4 March 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2586

zbMATH Keywords

\(q\)-separabilitymany-to-one stable matchingsresponsive preferencesubstitutable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unnamed Item

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