On the number of employed in the matching model

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.04.004MaRDI QIDQ2425191zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymatchingstabilitymaximal individually rational matchingnumber of employed

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405659 (Why is no real title available?)
• A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for General Stable Marriage
• A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
• Better and simpler approximation algorithms for the stable marriage problem
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Finding large stable matchings
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
• Size versus stability in the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model

Cited in

(4)

• Two-sided matching and strategic selection on freight resource sharing platforms
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems

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