On the number of employed in the matching model
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Publication:2425191
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.04.004zbMATH Open1417.91384OpenAlexW2942333426WikidataQ127967988 ScholiaQ127967988MaRDI QIDQ2425191FDOQ2425191
Yasunori Okumura, Minoru Kitahara
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.004
Cites Work
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- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Better and simpler approximation algorithms for the stable marriage problem
- A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for General Stable Marriage
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
Cited In (4)
- Two-sided matching and strategic selection on freight resource sharing platforms
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
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